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Changes in net lending hide the much larger and more variable gross lending flows. We 
present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time, bank size, 
and the business cycle. We look at both the intensive (increases and decreases) and extensive 
(entry and exits) margins. We compare these results with the output from a simple stochastic 
search model. 
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Economists and policymakers consider aggregate bank lending an important in
uence on the econ-
omy and a key part of the monetary transmission mechanism. This importance has been acknowl-
edged by the Federal Reserve (Greenspan 1997) and explored in a host of academic papers such as
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), or, more recently, Kashyap and Stein
(2000). The change in aggregate loans, however, presents an incomplete and at times misleading
picture of the market. An aggregate net change masks much larger gross changes, as lending in-
creases at some banks and decreases at others. The gross change in fact averages over six times
the net change, and is occasionally much higher.
In this paper, we use measures of loan creation, destruction, and gross 
ows{to further illuminate
the banking market. Just as these provide information missed by more popular statistics such as the
unemployment rate or employment growth, they similarly uncover the diversity behind traditional
measures such as total loans.
Looking at gross, as opposed to net, 
ows makes sense for a variety of reasons. Underlying
factors may aect the creation and destruction of loans dierently, in addition to separately aecting
the intensive and extensive margins. We explore the extent to which loan creation and destruction
dier over time and over the business cycle, and examine how important entry and exit are to loan
growth.
Recent theoretical work has suggested that such margins may be important. In Allen and Gale
(2000), concentrated diculties in a few banks can lead to a general contagion, whereas the same
losses spread across the entire system have a negligible eect. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000)
have a model with organizational capital where a decrease in loans via a bank failure has a much
more severe impact than loan contraction by a surviving bank, and Haubrich (1990) suggests that
such eects may explain why Canada's experience of the Great Depression was less severe than
that of the U.S.
Furthermore, as in the labor literature, concentrating on gross 
ows cuts the data in a manner
more appropriate for models that emphasize search frictions in the banking market, such as Wasmer
and Weil (2004), den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003), Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998), or other
models that exploit bank and borrower heterogeneity, such as Monge-Naranjo (2001) or Gorton and
He (2005).
2Indeed the credit market may have as strong a claim to search frictions as does the labor
market. Commercial bank loans are complicated contracts requiring negotiations over the interest
rate, fees, and covenants, with rms looking hard for the best deal. Conversely, banks work hard to
nd protable borrowers and screen out likely losses. Banks put great eort into both advertising
and loan evaluation, and practitioner publications are quite upfront about the search nature of the
business (see Wendel (2005) for an example).
Of course the academic literature has noticed this at some level, both in empirical work such
as Petersen and Rajan (2002), which looks at the eect of distance on lending relationships, and
theoretical work, such as Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), in which borrowers visit a number of lenders.
The work on credit scoring (and small business lending in general) certainly seems to depict a
market where matches are sought, but not always made. Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) look
at a sample of 4,637 rms, of which 2,011 applied for loans in their sample period. Of those banks
applying, 85% where approved.
Heterogeneity across banks matters for a variety of positive and normative questions. Under-
standing the monetary transmission mechanism requires understanding which banks (if any) are
particularly aected by tight money. Policymakers should know if reigning in nationwide in
ation
will crush the rustbelt or restrain only small banks. Policy designed for a non-existent \average
bank" may backre, particularly if it ends up punishing or rewarding a narrow group.
The proper regulatory response to other problems, such as excessive loan growth (perhaps
caused by such subsidies as deposit insurance), depends on how widespread the problem is, a factor
that aggregate growth rates cannot determine. If only a handful of banks are responsible, a policy
of tightening loan standards would be ineective if it left the high 
yers untouched and positively
perverse if it fell upon already contracting banks. Other policies might be designed to target specic
sub-groups. For example, the Basle capital standards had a selective goal: changing the portfolio
composition of undercapitalized banks (Haubrich and Wachtel 1993).
In this paper, we present a series of stylized facts about gross loan 
ows and how they vary
over time. Though such an exercise provides no denitive conclusions about the transmission of
monetary policy or the eectiveness of bank regulations, it adds, we feel, a perspective that oers
insights into those problems.
Although some papers such as Kashyap and Stein (2000) have looked at asymmetric responses
to macroeconomic shocks, there has been virtually no work on gross loan 
ows. (This discounts a
3a much earlier literature that uses the term to mean aggregate changes; see Torrance 1960). The
outstanding exception, of course, is recent independent work by Dell'Arricia and Garibaldi (2005)
which looks at the \Gross Credit Flows" of U.S. Commercial banks. Despite many similarities, our
papers have several substantial dierences. We use a longer data series (1959{2004 versus 1979{
1999), we track bank entry and exit (the extensive margin), we look at the distribution of changes
across banks, and we explicitly compare the gross loan 
ows with gross job 
ows. In addition, we
present a simple theory to help focus ideas. Conversely, we spend less time documenting business
cycle facts and disaggregating across regions, instead building on their excellent analysis.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 discusses data construction, section 3 presents
the basic stylized facts of gross loan 
ows, section 4 presents a simple model, while section 5 presents
more details on the distribution and cyclical properties of the data. Section 6 compares loan and
job 
ows, and section 7 concludes.
2 Data: source and construction
We dene loan creation as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased loans
since last quarter. Loan destruction is similarly dened as the absolute value of the change in loans
at all banks that decreased loans. The gross 
ow (akin to what Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) call
reallocation) is the sum of creation and destruction.
More formally, letting Li;t denote outstanding loans of bank i in period t, we dene:
Loan Creation: Ct =
X
i;t
(Li;t   Li;t 1)for those i s:t:Li;t   Li;t 1 > 0:
Loan Destruction: Dt =
X
i;t
jLi;t   Li;t 1jfor those i s:t:Li;t   Li;t 1 < 0:
Gross Flow: Dt + Ct:
For loan data, we take quarterly levels of total loans from the FFIEC Quarterly Reports of
Condition and Income (\Call Reports"). A few small banks were excluded from the sample, such
as banks that never made any loans. The data starts in 1959, quarter 4, continuing to 2004:3,
and is quarterly on regular basis starting in 1978:2. Because coverage was not uniform, for many
calculations we use data starting in 1969:4. Thus for most purposes we have approximately 2
million data points. The loans were adjusted for in
ation (using the CPI), converting all amounts
into 1982 constant dollars.
4For a number of small banks, there are missing call reports. Where this was infrequent, we
simply interpolated the loans from the preceding and succeeding calls, using straight line interpola-
tion. On rare dates, when many banks are missing their call reports, entire quarters were discarded
before loan creation and destruction gures were calculated.1
Four quarters were characterized by an expansion of the coverage in the call report. These were
1959:4, the start of our sample, where many banks \entered," and 1960:4, 1969:2, and 1980:2. In
these cases, the quarters were used to make the calculations of 
ows, and then discarded in the
nal analysis.2 For time series calculations, these dates where interpolated. In making this choice,
we take the opposite tack from Dell'Arriccia and Garibaldi; as a result, we have a longer, but less
consistent series. We adjust for this problem by looking at gross 
ows in percentage terms, which
should reduce the distortion from changes in number of banks reporting. In compensation, we get
a signicantly longer series containing many more business cycles.
The massive consolidation of the banking industry over this period presents the greatest chal-
lenge to using this data. If Bank1 and Bank2 each make $1000 of loans in quarter 1 and quarter
2, there is no creation or destruction. If lending remains constant, but Bank2 merges into Bank1,
Bank1 would show creation of $1000 and Bank2 would show destruction of $1000. We solve this by
redening creation and destruction for periods in which there is a merger. Specically, in this case,
we would dene creation as L1;t (L1;t 1+L2;t 1): In our time period there were mergers involving
6,889 target banks. Acquisitions, where the original bank kept its charter and thus continued to
report, did not cause a problem.
Bank mergers and their timing are taken from the FFIEC le on bank mergers. Further details
can be found in Craig and Santos (1999). We used a FORTRAN program to nd and identify
mergers. Actual mergers often went beyond one bank buying another. In some cases, several banks
merged together; in others, the banks merged and then took on a new name. A few small banks
were dropped because of diculty interpreting the merger results, either because no successor bank
was found or for other reasons (for example, where A bought B, B bought C, and C bought A).
These banks were all tiny and had a negligible impact on our result. The nal sample had 6,798
target banks.
1These dates clustered around the change from semi-annual to quarterly reports. We dropped 1976:1, 1976:3,
1977:1, 1977:3 and 1978:1.
2That is, if coverage expanded in period T, we computed the 
ows from T   2 to T   1 and from T to T + 1, but
interpolated the 
ow from T   1 to T.
5The date for mergers and exits are dened by the last positive entry in the call, not the ocial
merger date, as many banks ll out call reports one or two quarters after the ocial date.
Mostly we work with total loans, but we report a few statistics for commercial and industrial
(CNI) loans, in cases where their properties dier substantially from total loans. In this case
creating a consistent series across the entire sample was not possible. \Acceptances," included in
the early denitions of CNI, was split out in 1984 and later dropped from the call report in 2000.
As a result, there are two series of CNI loans: an 'old series' from 1959 until 2000, and a 'new'
series without Acceptances from 1984 to the present.3
3 An Illustrative Model
To help x ideas and further rene the economic intuition behind the notion of gross loan 
ows, we
explore a simple search-theoretic model of the lending process. Borrowing heavily from the search
labor literature, it does not pretend to be a deep theory about intermediation, nor of banking
structure, but it does aim to highlight the importance of lending 
ows. Unlike the labor literature,
however, there is virtually no data on the stock variables corresponding to unemployment and
vacancies, so the emphasis is even heavier on the 
ows of creation and destruction.
The model we adopt has many formal similarities to job search models, except that rms search
for nancing rather than workers. Since we are particularly interested in the eect of aggregate
shocks, our model is closest to Shimer (2005), which extends the Pissarides (1985) search model to
include aggregate shocks.
The model assumes a continuum of innitely lived, risk neutral agents called rms, who need
nancing before they can produce. A continuum of risk neutral and innitely lived banks, with
measure one, can provide this nancing, but (unmodelled) credit market frictions mean that banks
and rms must expend time and eort to search for each other and nd a suitable match.
Banks are endowed with a unit of capital that they may rent to a rm each period, provided
they are matched. If not lent to a rm, the capital provides 
ow utility z (perhaps the bank is
investing in government bonds or other non-loan assets). Firms use this capital to produce output,
with total output given by the random productivity shock p(t). To nd a bank, a rm must search,
3In particular, we make no adjustment for loan sales, in part because of the dearth of data post 1998, and in part
because treating only those loans on the books remains an important question, even if that number does not match
originations. For more on the loan sales market, see Gorton and Haubrich (1990) or Haubrich and Thomson (1996).
6paying a 
ow cost c. As in Shimer (2005) free entry drives the expected present discounted value
of search to zero. Holding everything else equal, higher productivity makes rms more willing to
pay the search cost and start searching for a loan. Given a match, the bank and rm separate
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate s(t).
Productivity and separation rates follow a rst order, two-state markov process in continuous
time. The rates may take on the two values f(pg;sg);(pb;sb)g Shocks hit the economy with Poisson
arrival rate , changing the values from (p;s) to (p0;s0). Formally, this makes matching a Cox
process (see Lando (1998)).
The time spent searching for a loan depends on both the number of rms searching and the
number of banks who have money to lend. Let B denote the measure of banks searching for
rms (the others are already lending to rms) and let F denote the measure of rms searching for
banks. Then (t)  F(t)=B(t) denes the F-B ratio at time t, which Wasmer and Weil (2004) call
an index of \credit market tightness." Assuming a constant returns to scale matching technology
m(B(t);F(t)), a bank nds a rm according to a Cox process with the time-varying arrival rate
f((t))  m(1;(t)). Conversely, rms nd banks at rate q((t))  m( 1
(t);1) = f((t))=(t).
We assume that matches have positive surplus, p(t) > z, and that this is split between the
parties via Nash bargaining with banks keeping a fraction . In other words, this bargaining
determines the interest rate charged on the loan.
All agents discount the future at rate r > 0.
3.1 Equilibrium
We will focus on equilibria in which the F=B ratio depends only on p;s and p;s, the F=B ratio
in state (p;s). Given this, the measure of banks looking for rms is determined by a dierential
equation
_ B(t) = s(t)(1   B(t))   f(p(t);s(t))B(t): (1)
A 
ow f((t)) of the B(t) banks without loans nd a rm and lend, while lending stops at s(t)
of the (1   B(t)) banks currently lending. An initial condition at the switch date pins down the
level of lending. Note that equation 1 is actually two dierential equations, one for the good state,
(pg;sg), and one for the bad state, (pb;sb): In the discussion that follows, this is also true for each
expression that is subscripted with p;s: the expression actually represents two conditions, one for
the good state, when it is the current state, and one for the bad state, when it is current.
7The Bellman equations can be combined into a recursive expression for the joint value of a
bank-rm match:
rVp;s = p   (z + f(p;s)Vp;s)   sVp;s + (Ep;sVp0;s0   Vp;s): (2)
Here Vp;s denotes the value in the current aggregate state, and Ep;sVp0;s0 denotes the expectation
of V following the next shock, conditional on the current state (p;s).
The rm's free entry condition provides another set of conditions. The 
ow search cost c must
equal the 
ow expected return, or the probability of a meeting times the rm's share in the gains,
or
c = q(p;s)(1   )Vp0;s0: (3)
Using 3 to eliminate Vp;s and Vp0;s0 from 2 gives
r + s + 
q(p;s)







Since the parameters (p;s) evolve according to a two-state markov process, 4 further simplies to
r + s + 
q(p;s)







Expression 5 represents two non-linear equations in two unknowns, pb;sb( b) and pg;sg(g).
Solution of these two equations yield equilibrium values for these two parameters, 
b and 
g; that
are constant as long as the state of the economy remains the same. Although in the steady state
loan creation equals loan destruction, the presence of aggregate shocks means the market is often
far from its steady state. Bank loans then evolve according to the dierential equation (1). As a







Notice that as t ! 1, Bi approaches its steady state value s
s+f(
i ); (so long as the state of the
economy, (p;s); does not change). The required initial condition comes from the fact that B, the
level of banks looking for loans, cannot jump even when the state changes, so k = Bi(t0)   Bi where
t0 is the time that the state changes to state i, and where  Bi denotes the steady state value of B
in state i.
8To illustrate, we follow the search literature and make the standard assumption that the match-
ing function takes a Cobb-Douglas form
f() = q() = 1 : (7)
Then
r + sg + 










r + sb + 
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This set of two equations has solutions, 
b and 
g; that are easily found by numerical methods.
If we further specialize the matching function 7 setting  = 1=2, (this is the number Wasmer
and Weil use for bank and rm matching) then the equilibrium credit tightness ratios, emerge as
the solution to a pair of simultaneous quadratic equations, where (9) has an analytical solution,
although it is quite complicated. For example, if we choose the following values for the parameters:
 = 0:5;sg = 0:1;sb = 0:2;r = 0:01;c = 0:35; = 1; = 0:075;pg = 1;pb = 0:9;z = 0:4 (10)
then g = 1:426 and b = 1:028 for the steady-state values of the F=B ratios in the good state and
the bad state in the case where  = 1=2.
Using (6) along with the parameters (10) allows us to create an articial series taking as input
a particular realization for the shock process. Figure 1 shows one such articial series for creation,
destruction, and gross 
ows. Although all 
ows vary over time, note that in the steady state, once
the shocks have dissipated, creation equals destruction. This does not hold true during transitions.
In the transition to the bad state, creation falls and destruction increases. When the economy
moves from the good state to the bad state, destruction increases because the separation rate is
higher; loan creation falls because match productivity is lower, leading fewer rms to search for
loans, leading to fewer matches. Because the new state changes the equilibrium , the ratio of
rms to banks, creation and destruction may dier in the transition. (Free entry of rms allows
the ratio to adjust instantaneously, but loans take longer to adjust.) Eventually, these factors work
to decrease the pool of loans and bring creation and destruction back into balance.
By explicitly including nding and separations, this model highlights the simultaneous creation
and destruction of loans, a key feature of the data. In contrast to most of the previous literature
9on aggregate lending, the model attributes changes in lending to changes in nding and separating
rates, an interaction between aggregate shocks and search frictions. In a recession, productivity
is low, so fewer rms are willing to pay the search cost, so ndings fall, and at the same time
separations increase. Together, these reduce total loans. Without the search frictions, aggregate
lending would be constant (all banks would be making loans) and creation and destruction would
always balance. With search frictions, creation and destruction do not always balance, and aggre-
gate lending growth results from an interaction between the 
ows created by the aggregate shocks
and the matching process. We nd this a useful framework to organize the data, to which we now
turn.
4 Gross Loan Flows: some elementary facts
Two sets of questions organize our exploration of the gross 
ows data. First, how heterogeneous
is the bank loan market? Does a small increase in total loans result from a small increase at most
banks or from banks with high creation osetting those with high destruction? How much of loan
growth results from banks entering and leaving the market? Is the growth concentrated in fast
growing rms, or spread more evenly across banks?
Second, how do gross 
ows dier over the business cycle? Is there a dierence between reces-
sions and expansions? For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), looking at job creation and
destruction, emphasize several features. They nd a high level of both creation and destruction in
all time periods. Good times or bad, many plants are hiring workers and many are laying them
o. In recessions, however, destruction dominates, and accounts for much most of the movement
in employment. We also nd high levels of both loan creation and destruction in all periods, but
changes in both creation and destruction contribute to reduced loan growth in recessions.
4.1 The basic time series
Our analysis centers on a time series for six variables: loan growth, creation, destruction, gross

ow, entry and exit. The time series starts with data for the fourth quarter of 1959, which, since it
has a date of December 30, shows up in plots as 1960. A few simple operations on the series, such
as plotting the data and calculating persistence will reveal the main characteristics.
Figure 2 plots the growth of real total loans, loan creation, and loan destruction. At least since
the early 1970's, when the data becomes more comprehensive, both loan creation and destruction
10Table 1: Loans
Growth Creation Destruction Entry Exit Gross
mean 0.86 3.12 2.25 0.11 0.49 5.37
median 1.08 3.07 2.05 0.06 0.26 5.27
std 1.52 1.17 1.26 0.14 0.68 1.90
min -4.06 0.66 0.27 0.00 0.00 2.12
max 5.09 7.12 6.20 0.93 4.40 12.99
remain high, though variable. Even when net loan growth was negative, such as the early 1980s
or the early 1990s, many banks were increasing the number of loans they made. In 1991:2, the
total value of loans fell by $20 billion: this was the dierence between creation of $40 billion and
destruction of $60 billion. Figure 3, which isolates out gross 
ows and loan growth, reinforces this
point: the gross loan 
ows far exceed the net loan 
ows. On average gross 
ows are over six times
aggregate loan growth.
Figures 4 and 5 concentrate on creation and destruction separately. Creation shows a general, if
irregular, upward trend, and entry has only a small part in loan creation: most creation comes from
existing banks. This is not surprising although it contrasts with Davis and Haltiwanger's result
which shows a much larger in
uence from plant creation. Their data is at the plant level whereas
ours is at the bank level. Opening a branch (which might correspond to a plant entry) thus would
correspond to an existing bank's increase. Exit plays a larger part in destruction, particularly
recently, though most destruction still comes about from surviving banks reducing their loans.
Table 4 expresses this in a somewhat dierent manner. It lists the mean, median, standard
deviation, maximum, and minimum of gross 
ows, creation, destruction, entry and exit, as a
percentage of total loans beginning in 1960:1. Overall, real total loans grow at an average (quarterly)
rate of 0.86 percent. This is a balance between a creation rate of 3.12 percent and a destruction
rate of 2.25 percent. Thus, in an average quarter there is a gross change of 5.37 percent of all bank
loans, over six times the net change.
Although the comparison will be imperfect on many levels, a comparison with the Davis and
Haltiwanger data on gross job 
ows can provide a simple benchmark for the loan 
ows. Table 2
reports their data, which are quarterly numbers from 1972:2 to 1988:4, a somewhat shorter sample
than for loans. The reallocation, creation, and destruction rates for jobs all exceed the equivalent
numbers for loans. Both markets exhibit large simultaneous creation and destruction, with gross

ows exceeding net growth.
11Table 2: Davis and Haltiwanger data
job growth creation destruction gross 
ow
mean -0.31 5.2 5.54 10.44
median 0.04 4.93 5.15 10.73
std 2.17 0.89 1.66 2.18
max 2.59 7.32 11.42 14.67
min -8.17 3.25 3.25 0.94
4.2 Distribution of changes
Not only do banks enter and exit the market, but they also create and destroy loans at very dierent
rates. Figure 6 displays a histogram depicting the distribution of creation rates among banks as a
fraction their total loans, beginning in 1970:1. Two features stand out. Modest increases account
for most creation: 50 percent of all loan creation occurred in banks that expanded loans between
0 and 10 percent. Large changes are not completely negligible, however. Banks that more than
doubled the value of their loans accounted for 8 percent of creation. New entry accounted for
another 5 percent. A category we label \strange," comprised of in-sample banks with no loans
in the previous period, added 0.6 percent. Thus more than one dollar in eight of new loans is
accounted for by banks that either more than doubled the value of their portfolio or did not exist
before.
Figure 7 depicts the distribution of destruction rates for the same time period. Again, modest
changes dominate: 50 percent of destruction was in banks that decreased loans by between 0 and
10 percent. Large changes are more important than for creation, however. Exits account for 20
percent, and decreases of 95-100 percent account for an additional 1 percent. Thus, slightly more
than one-fth of loan destruction comes from banks that drastically decreased their loans.
In one sense the dominance of banks with smaller growth rates should not be particularly
surprising. Most assets are concentrated at the larger banks, which might then be expected to
grow slower (see Evans 1987 for a more extensive discussion of this and related issues). Large
banks (assets above $5 billion) accounted for 51 percent of the loans in the sample, and 47 percent
of the total gross 
ows. The smallest banks (assets below $50 million) had slightly greater rates
of creation and destruction, but with only 6 percent of total loans it made little dierence to the
aggregates.
12Table 3: Total Loans
Recessions
Growth Creation Destruction Entry Exit Gross
mean -0.17 2.57 2.74 0.11 0.47 5.30
std 1.55 1.26 1.17 0.14 0.68 1.87
Expansions
mean 1.06 3.22 2.16 0.11 0.50 5.38
std 1.44 1.13 1.26 0.13 0.69 1.91
5 Gross Loan Flows and Business Cycles
From a macroeconomic perspective the interest in bank lending lies in its interaction with business
cycles. An exciting part of the gross job 
ows literature derived from the prominence of job
destruction in recessions. Gross loan 
ows have the additional possibility of shedding light on
the transmission and propagation mechanisms behind business cycles. How do gross 
ows change
over the business cycle, and what accounts for those changes? What has the focus on net changes
missed?
5.1 Cyclical patterns
Comparing the summary statistics for gross 
ows in recessions and expansions gives one set of
answers. Table 3 does this,using NBER cycle dates for the period 1969:4 to 2004:3.
The numbers in table 3 show a cyclical pattern, but neither creation nor destruction drives
the results. Loan growth slows, on average, by 1.2 percent (quarterly) between expansions and
recessions, and this is apportioned between a 0.7 percent drop in creation and a 0.6 percent increase
in destruction. Even in recessions, many banks increase lending. Entries stayed even, and more
surprisingly, exits, as a percentage of total loans, fell slightly. The stylized facts thus show neither
a uniform reduction by all banks nor a reduction concentrated in a few banks. Even in a recession,
many banks expand, few fail, and the decline in lending is broad based.
The distribution of creation and destruction does change somewhat across the business cycle,
as a look at the histograms in gures 8 and 9 show. There's no obvious pattern to the changes in
creation. For destruction, however, recessions show a marked increase in small levels of destruction
(at 10% and below) and a marked decrease at larger levels. Exits actually make up a larger fraction
of destruction in recoveries than in recessions.
135.2 Model estimation
We can take the business cycle analysis a step further by explicitly estimating the model of section
2. This will provide a notion of how nding and separating rates dier between recessions and
recoveries.
Before the model can be taken to data some simple work is needed to allow for the growth
of the banking sector over our sample, as the model assumes a constant measure of banks. This
requires an adjustment in the fundamental dierential equation, 6. If there were no increase in the
size of the banking sector, then creation would be given by
C = fiBN
where N represents the total size of the banking sector, and C represents total loan creation.






+ fikte (si+fi)t + u1t (11)






  sikte (si+fi)t + u2t: (12)
These equations do not hold if the banking sectors grows over time, however, and in general
any adjustment will depend on the growth process. We took a simple approach and assumed a
constant secular growth rate for the banking industry, with N = N0eht: Then creation and its
evolution become






+ fikte (si+fi)t + ht + u1t (13)
where h 
_ N
N is constant. One important dierence between this equation and equation (11) above
is that Nt is now a function of time, and not constant. For a static model, N can be thought of as
simply a normalization that sets the units for loan creation and can thereafter be ignored. Now






+ fikte (si+fi)t + ht + u1t (14)
14Table 4: Loans
fg sg fb sb
estimate 1.10402 0.10896 0.83782 0.11026






  sikte (si+fi)t + u2t: (15)
These two equations have two initial conditions embedded in them. The rst is actually a set
of initial conditions that changes with each regime shift. First, because the model does not allow
instantaneous jumps in total loans, the rst set species the the kt at each regime shift. Once we
know the time of each shift, these can be dened recursively once an initial value is chosen, though
the recursion is non-trivial.4 We set the time of the regime shift to coincide with the ocial NBER
denitions of recessions and expansions. We also need to set the value of the initial size of the
total loan pool, N0, which is unobservable. We arbitrarily set the value of k0, the initial value of
B in 1959 to be 0:5 for the estimates reported here, although we also estimated the model with
other values. Given the value of B0, then, we compute the desired loan total to be L0
B0 where L0
is the observed total value of loans. Our value for the secular loan growth rate, h, was set at 0.025
per year, about the rate of total loan increase over our sample period.
We estimated equations (14) and (15) using non-linear least squares with technique due to
Jorgenson and Laont (1974) which adjusts for contemporaneous correlation between the error
terms u1t and u2t. The estimates are:
The main cyclical pattern that emerges from table 4 is that loan ndings decrease during reces-
sions. Separations, increase, although statistically the dierence is not signicant. This is consistent
with the evidence presented above that in recession, creation falls and destruction increases and is
consistent with the general tone of our model. However, much work needs to be done before we can
say that these parameters are convincing estimates of loan nds and loan separations. The time
series properties of the unobserved error terms need to be handled, and the secular growth of the
banking sector needs to be modelled more explicitly. The estimates presented here are intended
4Thus, kt is simply Bt0, the value of B at the start of the current expansion or recession, which is in turn, a
function of the parameters fg;sg;fb;sb; the total duration of the last recession or expansion, and the value of the
initial condition of the previous spell, kt 1: However, kt 1 is itself a function of the parameters, fg;sg;fb;sb; the total
duration of the last recession or expansion, and the value of the initial condition of the previous spell, kt 2 and so
on, recursively back to the rst period in the sample, where the initial condition, k0 must be set. Once k0 is known,
then for each set of parameter values, fg;sg;fb;sb; the full set of initial conditions, kt can be recursively computed.
15more as an illustration that the model can be estimated in principle in such a way that it yields
plausible results. Our illustrative search model of loan generation is broadly consistent with our
gross loan 
ow data.
6 Job Flows and Loan Flows
A raw comparison of job 
ows and loan 
ows probably means little, in light of the very dierent
ways the data is organized and constructed, but viewed in percentage terms, some business cycle
and time series patterns emerge.
The most notable dierence between the two sets of series is the pronounced seasonality of the
job creation, destruction, and gross 
ows. Loan 
ows show only minor seasonality, at best. This
seasonality also lies behind the very dierent autocorrelation properties of the two data sets. At
a one-quarter lag, job 
ows show insignicant and generally negative autocorrelations. Loan 
ows
show positive and signicant, with the rst-order autocorrelation of between 0.2 and 0.4. At one
year, however, the job 
ows show a higher autocorrelation, between 0.6 and 0.8, as opposed to the
loans, which show coecient of between 0.2 and 0.4 at the year lag.
Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) point out an intriguing connection between job and loan 
ows.
Following the 1990 recession, employment grew extremely slowly, and the time period became
known as the \jobless recovery" . The period also witnessed particularly low loan growth (termed
`nancial head winds' at the time Greenspan 1997). Is this a robust pattern? The question is
particularly interesting because of the small impact loan 
ows and job 
ows seem to have on
each other, whether measures by cross-correlations or Vector Autoregressions. (not reported here).
Figure 10 conrms their point, looking at loan creation, destruction, and net growth around the start
of the 1990 recession. Destruction stays high and loan growth is persistently negative. Interestingly,
however, the pattern is not repeated after the 2001 recession (gure 11), which saw even more dismal
employment patterns (the \jobloss" recovery). The story is more complicated, however, if we turn
to CNI loans. 1990 still looks anomalous, though now because of slow loan growth prior to the
recession. In 2001 the slow loan growth appears after the recession, driven by noticeably lower
creation.
167 Conclusion
Anyone who has seriously looked at banking data is well aware of the diversity among banks.
A focus on gross 
ows suggests that exploring this diversity yields insights into the causes of
underlying trends. And the diversity can at time be shocking, as an anecdote from the southwest
shows. One of the largest drops seen in our data came in the third quarter of 1988: in the wake of
plunging oil prices, banks in the Dallas Federal Reserve district reduced total loans by ve percent
in one quarter, a 20% annual rate. The plunge was hardly uniform, however. In that same quarter
destruction ran at 24%, with creation a rather astonishing 19%.
Though rarely that extreme, gross 
ows are large: on average, over ve percent of total loans
are either created or destroyed, each quarter. This is about six times the net change in loans
per quarter. Like loans themselves, total gross 
ows are concentrated at the large banks, though
smaller banks show a greater proportion of creation and destruction than their share of net loan
growth would indicate.
At this stage of the investigation, many results raise more questions than they answer. Promi-
nent among this are the distribution of changes across banks. The bulk of creation and destruction
occur in banks making a change of less than 10 percent in their loans, but larger changes (either a
doubling or better of the loan portfolio or an entry or exit) have a substantial share, accounting for
one seventh of new loans and more than one dollar in six of all loans that a bank does not replace.
Furthermore, for destruction, smaller changes become more important in recessions. One reason
these results are worth noting is because traditional search theory say little about the distribution
of changes across rms.
The interaction of gross loan 
ows with the rest of the economy also seems worthy of further
study. The business cycles facts are suggestive but not tightly tied to a model: creation is higher
in expansions and lower in recessions, destruction is lower in expansions and higher in recessions,
and entry and exit don't show a cyclical pattern. Similarly, the relationship with labor gross 
ows
is suggestive, but needs to be 
eshed out. And, given the traditional importance of banks in
the transmission of monetary policy, the relation of gross loan 
ows to monetary shocks deserves
scrutiny.
In the labor literature, examination of gross 
ows helped call attention to the heterogeneity in
the employment relation. The banking literature as a whole has been well aware of heterogeneity
17among banks, but in many cases has lacked the proper perspective to make it manageable and
relevant. We think that the gross 
ows approach can help.
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